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Communications Security
L aw enforcement agencies in the US and else-where use voice telephone interception systemsto collect wiretap evidence and intelligenceagainst criminal and national security subjects.
Such systems provide a legal record of the digits dialed by
the subject and, in some cases, the audio content of the
calls themselves. Wiretapping is often credited as an es-
sential tool in the investigation and prosecution of serious
crime, especially when complex criminal enterprises and
conspiracies are involved.
Unfortunately, however, many of the telephone in-
terception technologies that law enforcement depends
on for evidence collection are less reliable than previously
thought. We found that the design and implementation
of these systems often render them vulnerable to simple,
unilateral countermeasures that allow wiretap subjects
(or their correspondents) to prevent accurate and com-
plete capture of call data and contents. These counter-
measures exploit the in-band signals passed between the
telephone network and the law enforcement agency.
In particular, the evidence collected by virtually all in-
terception systems based on traditional technology, as
well as at least some systems based on newer interfaces,
can be manipulated by the subject with practical tech-
niques and readily available hardware. We found one
countermeasure, requiring only a standard PC, that pre-
vents the accurate recording of dialed telephone numbers
and line statuses. Perhaps more seriously, we also found
simple countermeasures that effectively and selectively
suppress the recording of call audio with only modest
degradation of call quality.
Unlike traditional wiretap countermeasures (such as
encryption), our techniques are entirely unilateral—they
don’t require active cooperation be-
tween subjects and their associates—and
they obscure not only the content, but also the metadata
that indicates the presence of communication and its
endpoints in a way that is sometimes difficult to detect.
This has implications not only for the accuracy of the in-
telligence that can be obtained from these taps, but also
for the acceptability and weight of legal evidence derived
from it.
Our analysis is based entirely on information obtained
from published sources and equipment purchased openly
in the retail and surplus markets. Thus it is possible (per-
haps even likely) that motivated wiretap targets such as
those involved with organized crime have already discov-
ered and actively employed them. We recommend that
currently fielded telephone interception systems be eval-
uated with respect to these vulnerabilities and reconfig-
ured or modified where possible to reduce their
susceptibility. In addition, the possibility of these or simi-
lar countermeasures should be considered in analyzing
previously collected wiretap evidence and intelligence.
Despite law enforcement’s growing reliance on wire-
taps, little attention has been paid in the open literature to
their reliability. Indeed, this article could represent the
first analysis of the security of modern telephone wiretap
systems by the computing and communications research
community. Drafts of this article have been made avail-
able to the law enforcement community.
Wiretapping and US law
Broadly speaking, the federal laws governing electronic
surveillance for criminal (Federal Wiretap Act [Title
III]1) and national security (Foreign Intelligence Sur-
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Many law enforcement wiretap systems are vulnerable to
simple, unilateral countermeasures that exploit the
unprotected in-band signals passed between the telephone
network and the collection system. This article describes the
problem as well as some remedies and workarounds.
Communications Security
veillance Act [FISA]2) investigations authorize two cat-
egories of telephone wiretaps for use by US law en-
forcement agencies.
The first category, called a dialed number recorder
(DNR) or pen register, records the digits dialed and other
outgoing signaling information. DNR taps, which pro-
vide traffic analysis information, but not the call’s audio
contents or speaker identity, must pass relatively modest
judicial scrutiny to be authorized. A related investigative
technique, called a trap and trace for historical reasons, pro-
vides analogous information about incoming calls.
The second category, full audio interception (sometimes
called a Title III or FISA wiretap depending on its legal
context), records not only the dialed digits and signaling,
but also the actual call contents. Legal authorization for
full audio interception taps entails a higher standard of
proof and greater judicial scrutiny. Such taps are also
more expensive (and labor intensive) for the law enforce-
ment agency than DNR taps because they generally re-
quire continuous real-time monitoring by investigators.
Communication evidence isn’t produced exclusively
by wiretap interceptions, though: some investigative
functions are served by examining telephone accounting
and billing data that the carrier has collected. Law en-
forcement agencies occasionally subpoena telephone
records and use them as a source of intelligence or evi-
dence, but these aren’t, strictly speaking, interceptions for
the purposes of this article. First, they’re inherently “ret-
rospective,” meaning they report on the subject’s past
telephone activity rather than on future activity. Second,
they aren’t ordinarily available to the law enforcement
agency until sometime after the activity has occurred.
DNR and full audio wiretaps, on the other hand, are
“prospective,” meaning they report communication oc-
curring immediately after their installation, typically in
real or near-real time.
In practice, although the legal requirements for—and
information collected by—these two kinds of legal wire-
taps varies widely, the same equipment can be used to im-
plement both (audio-capture features can be disabled for
DNR-only taps). Two wiretapping technologies com-
monly available to law enforcement agencies are loop-
extender taps and CALEA taps.
Loop-extender taps
The most basic and oldest wiretap technology involves a
direct electrical connection between the subject’s tele-
phone line and a second line terminating at the law en-
forcement agency. Such a connection (literally a “tap”)
can be made anywhere along the length of the local loop
serving the subject, in the telephone switching office, or
on the subject’s premises. In principle, no special hard-
ware is required for such interceptions at the tap point;
it’s sufficient simply to “splice in” a pair of wires leading
back to the law enforcement agency’s facilities. To en-
sure proper isolation and level equalization of inter-
cepted content, current law enforcement practice for
such taps uses a small device, called a loop extender or
dial-up slave, at the splice point. The device sends any
audio on the subject’s line to the law enforcement line,
re-encodes the signals, and performs level equalization.
DNR equipment at the law enforcement agency de-
codes the dialed digit and call activity signals and, when
configured for a full audio interception, also records the
calls’ voice contents.
To tap a line with a loop extender, a voice-grade tele-
phone line (either a dedicated leased line or regular dial-
up line), controlled by law enforcement and terminating
at the law enforcement agency, is provisioned in such a
way that it shares at least one cable splice point with the
subject’s line. (In wiretap parlance, the subject line is
called the target line and the law enforcement line is called
the friendly line; see Figure 1.) The target line is physically
tapped and connected to the friendly line through a
loop-extender (or dial-up slave) device. (The terminol-
ogy isn’t completely standardized, but most vendors use
the term “loop extender” to refer to a device that uses a
leased line for the friendly line and the term “dial-up
slave” when the friendly line is a regular telephone line.
For simplicity, we use the term “loop extender” to refer
to either arrangement.) Any detected signals (and audio
content, when authorized) are decoded and logged by
the law enforcement agency equipment at the other end
of the friendly line.
Because loop extenders can intercept only wireline
(plain old telephone service [POTS]) telephone lines, the
technology has been largely supplanted in the US by the
CALEA systems described in the next section. However,
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Figure 1. Loop-extender wiretap architecture. The target telephone
line is tapped in the field with a loop-extender device, which relays
the signals and content to the law enforcement agency over its own
telephone line.
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recorder (DNR)
Loop
extender
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Central office switch
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analog loop-extender systems remain on the law enforce-
ment market, and some agencies still rely on them for
some or all of their interceptions.
CALEA taps
The second, newer, wiretap technology was designed to
comply with the US 1994 Communications Assistance
for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA),3 which mandates a
standard interface between telephone service providers
(including wireline and cellular services) and agencies
that perform wiretaps. In CALEA taps, the telephone
company (not the law enforcement agency) decodes the
signaling information and, when a full audio intercept is
authorized, separates out the call audio to its own chan-
nel. The law enforcement agency connects to the tele-
phone company through a standard interface, defined in
J-STD-025A,4 in which the signaling information (in-
cluding dialed digits, on-/off-hook status, and so on) and
call audio are sent to the agency over separate channels.
Whereas CALEA applies only in the US, J-STD-025A-
compliant switches and interception products are mar-
keted in other countries as well.
Each law enforcement agency conducting a J-STD-
025A interception leases one or more telephone lines be-
tween the agency facilities and the target’s telephone
switch (see Figure 2). The first of these lines carries a call
data channel (CDC) that reports the signaling data (call
times, numbers dialed, line status, and so on) associated
with all lines monitored by the agency at that switch. Ad-
ditional lines to the law enforcement agency carry call
content channels (CCCs) that contain the live audio of any
active monitored lines for which a full audio interception
has been authorized. The CDC might carry call data for
more than one active tap, and although a single CCC can
carry only one call’s audio at a time, a particular CCC can
carry audio for different subjects at different times, when
CCCs dynamically assigned as lines become active (with
the assignment reported over the CDC).
The J-STD-025A standard specifies the messages sent
on the CDC as well as several different delivery formats
for CDCs and CCCs. The simplest (and, we understand,
most widely deployed at this time) CDC and CCC
arrangement is via standard analog (POTS) telephone
lines or 56-Kbps ISDN bearer channels. However, the
CCC and CDC can also be delivered with IP packets
over a secure virtual private network (VPN).
Once a CDC (and, when needed, one or more
CCCs) has been provisioned between a switch and a law
enforcement agency, installing a tap on a new line is sim-
ply a matter of configuring the CALEA delivery system
at the switch to report activity on the target line. Al-
though telephone companies are free to implement the J-
STD-025A interface any way they wish, most systems
don’t require a special physical connection to the individ-
ual target line’s local loop.
Wiretap threat models
Perhaps surprisingly, there doesn’t appear to be a widely
agreed upon threat model against which law enforce-
ment wiretap systems are measured.
Most scientific and engineering research in commu-
nication security views the eavesdropper as the adversary
and is therefore concerned with guaranteeing that an ab-
stract and powerful eavesdropping attack will fail. This
perspective, while generally useful, doesn’t readily apply
when the threat is reversed to make the communicator
the adversary.
The most mature area of existing work that examines
the effectiveness of eavesdropping does so from the per-
spective of digital network intrusion detection. There,
the focus is on thwarting eavesdropping countermeasures
such as evasion and insertion.5–7 However, unlike net-
work intrusion detection systems, telephone wiretaps
aim to capture data about all communication, both nor-
mal and anomalous.
Detection
Perhaps the most prominently considered threat against
eavesdropping systems is detection. Surreptitious inter-
ceptions are thought to produce better intelligence than
those that aren’t. A vibrant, if occasionally somewhat dis-
reputable, technical surveillance and countermeasures
industry fuels both sides of the bugging and bug-detect-
ing arms race.
Wiretap systems that depend on direct metallic con-
nection to the local loop (such as loop-extender systems)
are potentially susceptible to detection by a range of
means. A tapping device installed at or near a subject’s
premises might be noticed in a physical inspection. De-
pending on the circuitry used, taps that change the line’s
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Figure 2. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act
(CALEA) wiretap architecture. The target line is tapped by the
telephone switch itself, with signals and content relayed over
separate lines.
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transmission characteristics can sometimes be discovered
electronically—for example, through sensitive loss mea-
surements or time-domain reflectometry. Taps might
also be exposed by penetrating a telephone company’s in-
formation systems or facilities, such as via rogue insider
access, computer compromise, or physical burglary. Loop
extenders marketed to law enforcement agencies usually
have a relatively innocuous physical appearance and high
impedance circuitry, but depending on how and where
they’re installed, an expert might still be able to detect
their presence.
J-STD-025A requires that switch-based CALEA
monitoring be undetectable to the subject and that the
computing systems provisioning and maintaining any in-
terceptions be adequately secured. However, the standard
doesn’t prescribe specific security mechanisms, nor does
it require special protection or authentication for CCC
and CDC traffic or links.
Encryption and content obfuscation
The most well understood countermeasures against
eavesdropping involve the use of cryptographic tech-
niques, and modern cryptosystems are thought to pro-
vide very good end-to-end security when implemented
properly. However, voice encryption isn’t widely used by
wiretap subjects. Furthermore, digital voice encryption
systems for analog telephones aren’t yet readily available
on the commercial market, and require the participation
of both parties to be effective. End-to-end encryption
protects only the content, not the dialed numbers or
other signaling (because the signal’s endpoint is the
phone network itself, not the called party).
Denial of service against CALEA CCCs
The law enforcement community and the telecommuni-
cations industry have already discovered at least one prac-
tical countermeasure against J-STD-025A CALEA call
content collection. This countermeasure prevents the
collection of subject call content on systems with dynam-
ically assigned CCCs and exploits the fact that the num-
ber of different voice channels associated with a
monitored line is potentially unbounded if the subject
subscribes to a call-forwarding service. Essentially, the
target and its correspondents “flood” a monitored line
with unrelated calls that are forwarded elsewhere. (The
number of forwarded calls is bounded only by the
switch’s call-forwarding limits.) Each additional call is as-
signed its own CCC, eventually leaving no CCCs open
for monitoring significant calls.
Although CALEA was partly motivated by new ser-
vices such as call forwarding, this countermeasure appar-
ently wasn’t considered in developing the original
CALEA interfaces. The problem was first publicly sug-
gested in recent patent disclosures8,9 for systems that
allow the law enforcement agency to disconnect super-
fluous CCCs. (This capability isn’t addressed in the J-
STD-025A standard.) The published literature says little
about whether wiretap subjects have actually employed
CCC flooding countermeasures or whether currently
fielded CALEA systems incorporate the defenses de-
scribed in the patents.
CALEA systems might also fail if the telephone com-
pany provisions the tap to monitor the wrong target line.
A recent report from the US Department of Justice
(DOJ) found instances of recorded traffic from FISA taps
that were later discovered to have originated from incor-
rect sources.10
Evasion, confusion, 
and the eavesdropper’s dilemma
In a separate work,11 we formalized the concepts of eva-
sion and confusion as eavesdropping countermeasures
and identified the “eavesdropper’s dilemma” as a funda-
mental trade-off in certain interception architectures.
Briefly, evasion occurs when a target can prevent legiti-
mate traffic from reaching the interception system, and,
conversely, confusion occurs when spurious traffic can be
directed at it. If a system is susceptible to either counter-
measure, the intercepted traffic’s fidelity can be arbitrarily
degraded, either by the target or, in some cases, by a third
party. The architecture of many eavesdropping systems
allows defense against evasion or confusion only at the
expense of increased exposure to the other, hence the
eavesdropper’s dilemma.
An interception system is subject to the eavesdropper’s
dilemma whenever it has incomplete knowledge of how
the network and receiver process traffic, or if it destroys
information processed at low layers of the protocol stack.
Although we introduced confusion, evasion, and the
eavesdropper’s dilemma in the context of digital network
interception, they can be readily applied against the analog
law enforcement wiretap systems described in this article.
Signaling countermeasures
against loop-extender taps
Loop-extender taps rely heavily on in-band signaling,
with an architecture that makes them especially vulnera-
ble to manipulation by the target. We found three kinds
of practical countermeasures against systems that use
these taps: the first masks the dialed digits of outgoing
calls, the second obscures incoming caller ID signals, and
the third (and perhaps most serious) disables audio mon-
itoring and recording by the agency.
Dialed digit spoofing
A fundamental weakness in the loop-extender tap model
arises from the way the tapping equipment decodes di-
aled digits and other audio signals. Although telephone
number signals represent “digital” information, they’re
transmitted on telephone lines in analog form. The most
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common dialing system uses audio dual-tone multifre-
quency (DTMF)12,13 signals. DTMF is also popularly
known by its original AT&T trademark, TouchTone.
Analog DTMF signals are decoded and converted to dig-
ital form at the telephone company switch.
DTMF digit signals consist of two audio frequency
tones: a “low” tone corresponding to the horizontal
“row” position of the digit on the keypad and a “high”
tone corresponding to the “column” position. Al-
though the familiar consumer telephone DTMF keypad
has 12 digits (0 through 9, *, and #) arranged in four
rows and three columns, the DTMF standard specifies a
fourth column, giving four additional tone signals, usu-
ally called A, B, C, and D. The C button, for example, is
conceptually located to the right of the 7, 8, and 9 but-
tons (see Figure 3; these fourth-column tones will be
important to us later.)
Although most telephone instruments produce tone
signals well within the “standard” acceptable range of
properly operating DTMF decoders, tone signals at the
edges of the standard parameters will be accepted by
some decoders but not others. Many parameters affect
whether a given decoder will recognize a given tone sig-
nal as a valid dialed digit, including the precise frequen-
cies of the two tone components, their overall power
level, the relative amplitude of the tones, signal duration,
waveform distortion, external noise, and so on.
Two observations follow directly from the analog na-
ture of DTMF signals and their decoding by telephone
switches:
• Because DTMF transmission and decoding are analog
processes, for any given parameter (frequency, ampli-
tude, and so on), no two DTMF decoders will use pre-
cisely the same threshold to determine whether a
given signal is accepted or rejected (the analog eaves-
dropper’s dilemma).
• By completing or not completing dialed calls, a tele-
phone switch is an oracle for determining whether
DTMF signals sent to it have parameters within its
tolerances.
We found that by systematic DTMF dialing with selec-
tively degraded parameters, analog telephone subscribers
can discover the thresholds of their switches’ DTMF de-
coders efficiently and with sufficient accuracy and preci-
sion to construct signals that other decoders would likely
treat differently.
In a loop-extender wiretap system, two different
DTMF decoders process each dialed digit on the target
line independently: one at the law enforcement agency
(to determine the dialed number that is logged) and an-
other at the telephone company switch (to determine the
number the telephone network uses for actual call pro-
cessing). This means that each tone parameter of each
digit either has tone encodings that are accepted as valid
by the switch but not the wiretapper, or encodings that
are accepted as valid by the wiretapper but not the switch.
Note that this property is inherent to any interception
system in which a separate DTMF decoder is used at the
tap; it doesn’t depend on the failure of any equipment to
operate within standard specifications.
In our experiments, a simple, automated binary
search (involving roughly 30 to 120 minutes of unat-
tended experimental dialing and analysis with a laptop
computer) could discover the precise threshold charac-
teristics of a given telephone switch’s DTMF decoder
with sufficient accuracy to distinguish it from other de-
coders. Spurious digit encodings can then be constructed
that are just outside the accepted parameters of the
switch’s decoder (such that they would have no effect on
the actual number dialed), but that will be accepted with
high probability by an external law enforcement tap.
These signals thus attempt to confuse a tap. Conversely,
non-standard digit encodings can be constructed that are
just within the parameter range accepted by the switch,
but that will be ignored with high probability by an ex-
ternal law enforcement tap. These signals thus attempt to
evade a tap.
This probe discovers nothing about the limits of the
wiretap’s DTMF decoder (or even if a wiretap is present),
but it doesn’t need to. Because of the analog eavesdrop-
per’s dilemma, and as our experiments confirm, a wire-
tap’s decoder will always be either more liberal or more
conservative than the switch in handling signals at the
edges of acceptance. When a wiretap is conservative,
digit signals accepted by the switch evade detection by
the tap. When a wiretap is liberal, it accepts extraneous
confusion digit signals ignored by the switch.
Complete telephone numbers can be dialed with a
combination of evasion digits and confusion noise, such
that the complete, correct number will be received as in-
tended at the switch, but where some or all of the digits
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Figure 3. Dual-tone multifrequency (DTMF) keypad and waveforms
of generated tone. Each row and column of the keypad generates a
tone signal; when a key is pressed, the row and column tone are
combined and sent on the line.
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recorded by the tap are incorrect. (Depending on the
exact hardware at the switch and the tap, the tap will pre-
dominantly tend to either ignore evasion digits or accept
confusion digits. The subject can’t predict whether con-
fusion or evasion dominates without access to the tap
hardware, but the tap logs incorrect numbers in either
case.) The software to perform the probing and the dial-
ing can be quite simple, requiring only modest com-
puter, sound card, and modem hardware.
A wiretap can never reconstruct evaded digit signals
that it ignores by being too conservative. The obvious de-
fense against evasion is thus to use a more liberal decoder
at the tap. Unfortunately for the wiretapper, an intercep-
tion system that is too liberal becomes susceptible to con-
fusion. Although an overly liberal decoder might seem to
be a “lesser evil” than one that is overly conservative (be-
cause fewer potential digits are discarded), confusion can
achieve perfect secrecy under ideal conditions.
Confusion and evasion dialing are effective against any
eavesdropping system that performs its own DTMF de-
coding and commits to a single interpretation of the dig-
its. In a full audio tap, it might be possible to later conduct
offline forensic analyses of recorded tone signals and re-
construct evaded or confused digits. However, such an
analysis would depend on the precise tolerances of the
local central office (CO) and the transmission character-
istics between the tap and the subject at the time of the
call. Deriving these parameters requires active probing
from the tap, similar to that performed by the subject.
Current wiretapping technology has no mechanism for
performing such probes, and so precludes such analyses.
Of course, a subject can’t be sure whether an eaves-
dropper’s DTMF decoder will be more conservative or
liberal than that of the switch for any given parameter, and
so can’t be sure whether confusion or evasion will be more
successful at masking dialed numbers. There’s no need to
choose between the two, however; confusion and evasion
dialing can be used in concert across an entire string of di-
aled digits. Here, the subject intersperses n random noise
digits in random positions among the l “true” digits to be
dialed. The true digits are signaled using evasion, and the
noise digits are sent using confusion.
This combined dialing technique is effective to the
extent that either confusion or evasion dialing succeeds
often enough to mask the actual dialed number. Our ex-
periments with standard law enforcement loop-extender
tap hardware as well as with the taps we constructed based
on laboratory and diagnostic DTMF signal analyzers sug-
gest that these countermeasures are both practical and re-
liably effective at hiding the true dialed number.
Dialing experiments
To test the practical effectiveness of confusion and eva-
sion dialing, we conducted experiments under a variety
of simulated network conditions and with a range of tap-
ping hardware. Our results support our analytical hy-
pothesis that confusion and evasion are effective at
preventing DTMF digit recording in taps (such as loop
extenders) that rely on their own DTMF decoders.
Figure 4 depicts our experimental setup. A CO
switch simulator interprets DTMF tones from the “tar-
get” line (the simulated subject’s phone line), generates
call progress, ringing, and caller ID signals, and switches
calls. The subject line is equipped with both a normal
telephone and a Pentium laptop computer with a
modem, sound card, and telephone audio interface. The
laptop modem is used to seize the line, while the sound
card generates confusion and evasion dialing signals. The
telephone set is used for the actual voice communication.
To account for different telephone line and CO con-
ditions, we ran our experiments with several simulated
and actual telephone switches, including Teltone TLS-
5C and Ameritec AM-7 simulators and the Western
Electric/Lucent 5-ESS switch that serves one of the au-
thors’ homes. (The Teltone and Ameritec devices simu-
late most aspects of a telephone switch, decoding and
generating all loop signals and providing voice paths; we
simulated the loss and distortion of the local loop with
Telebyte model 453 variable-length 26-gauge cable sim-
ulators.) Results were similar under all setups; the data
shown here used the Teltone simulator.
The primary tapping device in our tests was a Recall
Technologies model NGNR-2000 (a current law en-
forcement loop-extender DNR and audio collection
system). We also constructed our own taps using various
laboratory and diagnostic DTMF decoders. In all setups,
every tap was able to correctly reconstruct all dialed digits
when no countermeasures were employed.
The first step in confusion and evasion dialing is deter-
mining the switch’s limits. Although many parameters are
defined for proper DTMF tones,13,14 we concentrated on
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Figure 4. Experimental wiretapping configuration. A simulated
central office with two telephones, simulated transmission losses,
and connected to various wiretapping systems.
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six: the amplitude of the high-tone component (recall that
a DTMF signal consists of a high-frequency tone mixed
with a low-frequency tone), the low tone’s amplitude, and
the positive and negative frequency skews of the high- and
low-frequency tone components. Our probe software
used a simple binary search for each parameter’s limits. In
each trial, it dialed a nonexistent number (say, 555-010X),
with the parameter under test (say, the high-tone fre-
quency) varied on the last digit. If the switch recognized
the entire dialed number (as indicated by a call completion
signal), then the parameter was within the switch’s toler-
ance. However, if the switch didn’t attempt to route the
call (as indicated by a lack of response), then the parameter
was outside the switch’s tolerance. The binary search nar-
rows a pair of differentiating values for each parameter and
each digit. Signals with the parameter value within the
switch’s tolerance can be used for evasion, whereas tones
outside the tolerance can be used for confusion. We per-
formed this search for all six parameters and for each
DTMF digit (0 through 9). As we mentioned earlier, the
entire automated probing process took approximately 30
to 120 minutes to complete; in practice, a subject would
repeat this search as needed to compensate for drift in the
switch decoder hardware and changes in the transmission
characteristics between the subscriber and the CO.
After probing the switch, we tested evasion and con-
fusion dialing. Table 1 shows the effects of evasion dialing
alone. Here, all digits were transmitted with evasion para-
meters, causing the switch to barely recognize the tones.
As the table shows, although the switch received the full
number and completed the call, only one of the wiretaps
correctly captured all dialed digits.
In this case, evasion was moderately successful; it pre-
vented most of our taps from capturing at least one digit
of the dialed number. Adding confusion, however,
makes the eavesdropper’s job even harder. In our next
experiment, we inserted confusion signals uniformly at
random among the evasion-dialed digits. For readability,
we show here an experimental run in which the target
sends 20 confusion digits along with the 11-digit num-
ber; more confusion digits would ordinarily be sent in
actual countermeasure use.
Table 2 shows the results of using both confusion and
evasion. As before, the switch correctly processed the de-
sired number. All tested DTMF decoders were suscepti-
ble to both confusion and evasion, and not only failed to
record some evaded digits, but also accepted some confu-
sion signals. Confusion was particularly effective against
the Ameritec AM8a, which recorded a total of 22 dialed
digits. The number of possible 11-digit reconstructions
of this string is approximately 
= 705,432,
and we note that not a single one of these interpretations
is the actual dialed number because some of the digits
were evaded.
Incoming calling-number ID spoofing
Calling-number ID (CNID, sometimes referred to as
caller ID) is an optional feature offered by local exchange
carriers that allows a subscriber to screen incoming calls.
If CNID service is enabled on the called party’s line, the
CO transmits the caller’s telephone number and, if avail-
able, the name associated with that account. The CNID
information is relayed using in-band signaling between
the first and second ring signals. Special devices display
the incoming calling number to the subscriber.
When CNID service is active on a target’s line, any
wiretap device can also decode and record the source of
incoming calls. Note that if CNID isn’t present, loop-
extender taps must learn the caller’s number through
some other mechanism (such as billing records).
Because the CO transmits the CNID data, evasion
isn’t possible. However, a subject can trivially confuse the
capture of the CNID transmission by injecting counter-
feit signals on the line.
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DEVICE INTERPRETATION IN THE
PRESENCE OF EVASION
Recall model NGNR-2000 (DNR device) 18753210
Ameritec model AM8a 1976541
DSchmidt model DTMFLCD-2 1976543210
Harris model 25D 19876543210
Metro-Tel model TPM32MF 1976541
Metro-Tel model VNA70A 19765421
Table 1. Dual-tone multifrequency (DTMF)
evasion of dialed number 1-987-654-3210.
DEVICE INTERPRETATION IN THE PRESENCE
OF EVASION AND CONFUSION
Recall model NGNR-2000 149876465642392120
(DNR device)
Ameritec model AM8a 1346676649919555432610
DSchmidt model DTMFLCD-2 1497645432120
Harris model 25D 139876419556432610
Metro-Tel model TPM32MF 1476411543210
Metro-Tel model VNA70A 14876411543210
* The dialed number is 1734966876649916955564239261200 (bold digits were
sent using evasion parameters and the other digits were sent using confusion).
Table 2. DTMF evasion and confusion of dialed 
number 1-987-654-3210.*
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To confuse a wiretapper’s recovery of incoming
CNID, we simply replayed periodically (through the
sound card) a forged CNID audio signal while the target’s
phone was on-hook. (We used a single static number for
this purpose but a more sophisticated subject could gen-
erate new signals each time.) In every case in our experi-
ments, the wiretap decoded the forged signal instead of
the legitimate CNID transmission when incoming calls
were received (see Table 3).
Line status spoofing 
and recording suppression
In-band signaling makes full audio loop-extender taps es-
pecially vulnerable to countermeasures. A subject can re-
motely disable any audio recording equipment (and
cause the system to log line inactivity) for arbitrary peri-
ods during a call by spoofing the on-hook signal gener-
ated by a loop extender.
In loop-extender systems, all signaling data and audio
are sent to the law enforcement agency over a single
channel (the friendly line), entirely in the analog voice-
band domain. Any call progress and line status signaling
data from the target that the law enforcement system is to
process or record must therefore be sent over the same
channel that carries the target audio (in-band). This, as
we shall see, is a rather fragile arrangement rich in poten-
tial for exploitation by the target.
An intercept-collection system must record several
kinds of call-processing signals from the target’s tele-
phone line. Some of these signals (including DTMF-
encoded dialed digits, incoming calling-number ID, and
audible call progress signals such as dial tones and busy
and audible ringing signals) are already encoded in the
voice-band audio domain as part of the standard tele-
phone interface. These signals simply pass through the
dial-up slave’s normal audio interface and can be decoded
entirely by the law enforcement hardware (although, as
noted earlier, not always correctly). Other telephone sig-
nals, however—most notably the on-/off-hook state, ro-
tary “pulse” dialed digits, and incoming-call ringing
signals—aren’t encoded in the audio domain on the tar-
get line, depending instead on the (DC) voltage and cur-
rent on the wire between the CO switch and the target’s
telephone instrument. Although the dial-up slave unit
can detect these signals relatively easily by observing the
line voltage, they can’t simply be relayed back over the
friendly line in the same form for processing by the
agency (that line’s voltage and current maintain the con-
nection through the telephone network between the
loop extender and the agency itself). These signals are
therefore encoded as special audio tones superimposed
on the friendly line audio, and recognized and decoded as
such by the law enforcement equipment.
The most important signal that isn’t already in the
voice-band audio domain (and from whose state many
of the other DC signals can be derived) is the on-/off-
hook status. Ordinarily, when the line is on-hook, no
target audio or other signals would be present on the
line. This gives rise to a simple (perhaps too simple)
audio encoding of line status: an idle tone is sent contin-
uously on the friendly line whenever the target line is
detected in the on-hook state and removed when the
line goes to the off-hook state. Most loop-extender
(and dial-up slave) systems marketed to law enforce-
ment use this scheme.
In fact, not only do virtually all loop extenders indi-
cate line status with an idle tone, they almost all use the
same de facto standard idle-tone signal: the DTMF C
digit (a two-frequency audio signal consisting of 852 Hz
and 1,633 Hz; some literature mentions the use of the A
tone for this purpose, but all current vendors of which
we are aware use C). This is the only audio signal added
to the friendly line by some dial-up slave and loop-ex-
tender products. (Other models also provide additional
signals to indicate incoming ringing and periodic “keep
alive” off-hook status signals, usually using fourth-col-
umn DTMF tones.) Because the loop extender sends
the on-/off-hook status signal over the same channel
that carries the target audio, legitimate indications of
changes in target line status can’t be distinguished from
an identical-sounding signal generated by the target
while a call is in progress.
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DEVICE NO CONFUSION (BASELINE) WITH CONFUSION
Recall (model NGNR-2000) DNR device (987) 654-3210 (215) 898-5000
Tony Soprano Matt Blaze
RadioShack trim phone with caller ID 987-654-3210 215-898-5000
(model 43-3909A) TONY SOPRANO MATT BLAZE
Tempo (model ID’R Plus) (987) 654-3210 (215) 898-5000
Tony Soprano Matt Blaze
US West Call Waiting ID (model CI-98) 987-654-3210 215-898-5000
TONY SOPRANO MATT BLAZE
Table 3. Using confusion to forge calling-number ID.
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New-call spoofing. Unexpected use of the idle signal
can trigger bugs in some loop-extender equipment. At
least one system that we tested (a Recall Technologies
NGNR-2000) would become distressed if a DTMF C
idle signal wasn’t immediately followed by new call setup
signals; this apparently caused the device to conclude that
it lost the connection with the slave unit, disconnect the
friendly line, and initiate a new connection. Under best-
case conditions, it required more than 30 seconds to
reestablish the connection to the loop extender or dial-up
slave. It was very easy to exploit this vulnerability; we sim-
ply sent the DTMF C signal for 3 seconds. This would
cause the collection function to stop recording audio for
the 30 to 45 seconds required to establish the connection.
Sending the DTMF C tone on the target line for 3 sec-
onds every 30 seconds would allow no audio to be
recorded by the wiretap with this hardware. We can’t
speculate on the performance of other DNR and record-
ing devices in this regard without testing them, of course.
Even loop-extender systems that correctly process
idle signals can be manipulated. The target (or the target’s
correspondent) can introduce a false new-call record by
sending the 852-Hz + 1,633-Hz DTMF C signal on the
line during a call for long enough for the wiretap to de-
tect an on-hook condition and register (incorrectly) that
the current call has ended. At this point, the target can
send additional DTMF and audible ringing signals to
simulate a new call being placed (presumably to a differ-
ent number), all the while maintaining the connection
with the original correspondent.
Of course, sending a brief burst of C tone doesn’t by
itself prevent the capture of the call content (except on
buggy interception equipment such as the Recall), but it
does allow the target to introduce spurious call records
into the wiretap logs and to associate captured call con-
tent with false telephone numbers.
Recording suppression through C tone spoofing.
The use of the in-band C tone idle signal has even more
serious consequences for full audio wiretaps: the subject
can suppress content recording for arbitrary periods.
Loop-extender systems turn off audio recording
when a C tone signal is detected. Naturally, subjects can’t
easily converse while a spoofed C tone is sent at full vol-
ume over the target line (unless they employ special nar-
row-band filters to eliminate it). However, there is no
need for the subject (or the correspondent) to send the
tone at full volume.
We found that even under conditions very unfavor-
able to the target (in which the law enforcement equip-
ment was attenuated by 10,000 more feet of 26-gauge
cable than the total connection length between the target
and the correspondent), it was possible to falsely indicate
an on-hook condition and turn off the recording equip-
ment with a continuous C tone sent at very low ampli-
tude. False signals of as little as –40 dBm total power on
the target line were sufficient for this purpose. We found
it readily possible to carry on an intelligible, even com-
fortable, conversation over this tone, with the audio
completely evading wiretap collection because the
recording was turned off and muted.
Note that the vulnerability to this countermeasure is a
fundamental property of the in-band signaling architec-
ture used between the loop extender and the intercep-
tion recording system. It could be prevented only by the
loop extender filtering out DTMF C tone signals from
the target audio stream sent over the friendly line; we
aren’t aware of any loop extenders or dial-up slave prod-
ucts that perform such filtering, however.
You can find an MP3 audio example of a conversation
evaded with C tone at www.crypto.com/papers/
wiretapping/.
Signaling countermeasures
against CALEA taps
At first blush, the J-STD-025A CALEA interfaces seem
to effectively neutralize in-band signaling countermea-
sures; separate channels deliver the target’s signaling (the
CDC) and voice traffic (the CCC), and allow decoding
of DTMF tones at the switch instead of at a second unit at
the law enforcement agency. Because the telephone
company is responsible for DTMF decoding before
sending the data to the agency, it’s likely that the reported
digits are derived directly from the switch’s call-process-
ing system, and because the line status is reported over a
separate signaling channel, such systems need not be vul-
nerable to in-band spoofing of the line status. Neverthe-
less, many CALEA implementations fall short of
achieving the level of robustness that their architecture
would appear to allow.
Many CALEA configurations may indeed be more
reliable than traditional loop-extender systems with re-
gard to susceptibility to confusion and evasion dialing.
However, we note that CALEA and J-STD-025A spec-
ify only a standard interface between the telephone com-
pany and law enforcement; they don’t require or assume
any particular implementation of these interfaces, and
they don’t require effectiveness or performance beyond
that which pre-CALEA systems achieved. Therefore, al-
though most CALEA-compliant telephone switches
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We found it readily possible to carry
on an intelligible conversation over
this tone, with the audio completely
evading wiretap collection.
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presumably report the actual digits recorded by the
DTMF decoder that processes the calls, there is no ex-
plicit requirement that they do so, and thus there is no
guarantee that the dialed numbers reported to law en-
forcement accurately reflect those processed by the
switch. Moreover, “post-cut-through” digits reported
on the CDC—those processed not by the switch but by a
remote endpoint (such as a voicemail system)—can still
be confused or evaded.
A more serious potential vulnerability in CALEA im-
plementations is recording suppression via an in-band
“continuity tone” signal that some collection system im-
plementations recognize on the CCC. The processing of
this signal renders such systems vulnerable to the same
content evasion countermeasures that work against loop-
extender systems.
Recording suppression
in CALEA implementations 
Although the J-STD-025A standard appears to eliminate
the possibility of in-band signaling countermeasures by
providing the law enforcement agency with call content
and signaling in separate delivery channels, actual imple-
mentations sometimes blur this distinction. In particular,
some CALEA implementations use the DTMF C tone
signal to indicate that a CCC is in the idle state. Recall
that this is the same signal used to indicate line status in
loop-extender systems. The C tone is processed by some
CALEA CCC collection systems in much the same
way—as a signal to disable the recording equipment.
This mechanism might have been motivated by a de-
sire for backward compatibility with loop-extender col-
lection systems. Law enforcement agencies and
telephone companies can construct any of a variety of
CALEA collection system architectures. The CDC and
CCC can be delivered to the agencies directly over sepa-
rate telephone lines or an IP VPN, or they could employ
the services of an intermediate CALEA service provider
such as Pen-Link or Xlence. Some CALEA collection
systems are designed to accept CDC and CCC channels
directly, whereas others adapt “legacy” loop-extender
recording systems. The US Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion (FBI) and the DOJ explicitly requested that the con-
tinuity tone on idle CCC channels be a required CALEA
feature in a list of proposed improvements to the original
J-STD-025A specification.15,16 Although the US Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) didn’t ultimately
adopt the continuity tone as a requirement,16 it has be-
come a common optional feature cited in CALEA ven-
dor literature and system patents.8,17–19 In particular, the
C tone on the CCC is often specified in product litera-
ture as a mechanism to control the collection system’s
audio recording equipment—that is, when the C tone is
present, the CCC is assumed to be idle (regardless of the
call status as reported on the CDC) and the collection
system can automatically mute audio monitoring and
stop the recording equipment. The C tone is also used in-
ternally by some switch-side CALEA delivery systems.
Just as with loop-extender systems, these configura-
tions (sometimes called C tone supervision) make it pos-
sible for a subject to unilaterally disable content recording
by sending a continuous C tone at an amplitude suffi-
ciently high to trigger the recording-suppression mecha-
nism but low enough to allow intelligible conversation.
Because the same tone is also used to suppress recording
in loop-extender systems, the target need not know
whether CALEA or loop-extender taps are used by the
agencies he or she wishes to evade.
Not all CALEA implementations support C tone su-
pervision signals; it’s an optional feature not required by
the standard. However, the C tone appears to be a rela-
tively commonly available option among current
CALEA systems that use analog or ISDN bearer channels
for CCC delivery and in CALEA products designed for
output to legacy collection equipment.
Discussion
The signaling protocol failures described in this article
are of significance to a broad range of communities for
several reasons. First, of course, is the immediate prob-
lem of conducting reliable lawful interception without
evasion or manipulation by the subject. In fact, this is a
subtler problem than it might first seem to be. Some-
one who believes that he or she is being wiretapped can
reliably evade interception simply by refraining from
using the suspected telephone line for incriminating
conversations or by using a voice encryption system for
such calls. However, history suggests that “telephone
silence” isn’t a satisfying solution for many wiretap sub-
jects because many criminal enterprises apparently rely
extensively on telephone communication. Neither
does end-to-end encryption provide widespread prac-
tical cover for many law enforcement targets. Encryp-
tion requires advance planning for the use of special
hardware by both peers, and reliable voice telephone
encryption systems still aren’t widely available on the
commercial market. The signaling countermeasures in
this article, on the other hand, not only require less so-
phisticated equipment than encryption (and only uni-
lateral action), but also can be used to actively mislead
an investigator with incorrect or incomplete intercep-
tion records.
22 IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY      ■ NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2005
The problem of in-band signal abuse
in particular has a long history in
communication security.
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Whether signaling countermeasures are attractive to
or likely to be employed by subjects depends on how
they perceive the threat. Because wiretaps are usually
secret, a subject can never be sure that he or she is actu-
ally being monitored or whether monitoring is con-
ducted with a susceptible system. However, because of
the relative lack of tapping-system diversity, a target
could make an educated guess as to whether agencies
could be expected to conduct an investigation are using
vulnerable equipment. Federal and local agency pro-
curement contracts for wiretap equipment are often
publicly available. With a simple Internet search, we
were able to discover vendors and even model numbers
of the equipment that several agencies in various juris-
dictions use.
There is evidence (albeit indirect and inconclusive)
suggesting that sophisticated targets might sometimes
employ signaling countermeasures. For example, law en-
forcement agents have noted (in trial testimony) unex-
plained audio gaps in wiretap recordings, with specific
reference to C tone signals.20
More broadly, the existence of signaling counter-
measures suggests that the wiretap technology used by
law enforcement should be critically evaluated against
a wider range of threats than perhaps it has been. The
scope of our analysis was deliberately restricted to in-
formation and materials we obtained from public
sources and was limited to the narrow problem of con-
fusion and evasion countermeasures. We made no at-
tempt to be exhaustive or comprehensive, yet we
quickly discovered practical attacks that seem rather
obvious in hindsight. Some of the potential vulnerabil-
ities in modern CALEA systems arise directly from fea-
tures (for example, the CCC continuity tone)
requested by the law enforcement community itself. It
seems at least plausible that as-yet undiscovered weak-
nesses exist in the J-STD-025A specification (and the
systems that implement and support it). A systematic
effort to discover or rule out vulnerabilities would im-
prove confidence in these systems.
Finally, the protocol failures and signaling weak-
nesses in voice wiretaps provide an overall case study in
computer and communication security. Well-estab-
lished principles of secure system design appear to have
been violated in the loop-extender and CALEA tap ar-
chitectures, with interfaces subject to multiple interpre-
tations and complex interacting features and options
that strain to maintain backward compatibility with
“legacy” systems.
The problem of in-band signal abuse in particular has
a long history in communication security, most famously
exposed in the US and international long-distance tele-
phone network of the 1960s and 1970s (see the sidebar).
And yet, vulnerable systems that depend on unprotected
in-band signals for critical functions continue to be de-
signed and fielded, suggesting that many security practi-
tioners and system designers don’t adequately understand
or appreciate the risks inherent in such designs.
T here is, unfortunately, little room to make conven-tional analog loop-extender interception systems
more robust against these countermeasures within their
design constraints. Audio recording of dialing signals pro-
vide limited opportunities for subsequent forensic analysis
of confused or evaded dialed digits (assuming the charac-
teristics of the CO and transmission line can be accurately
estimated later), although legal constraints generally pre-
clude agencies from making such recordings on DNR-
only taps.
Vulnerable CALEA systems, on the other hand,may
be able to be made more robust against specific counter-
measures with relatively minor configuration changes.
In particular, the law enforcement equipment that
processes the CCC should be configured not to shut off
when a C tone is present on the channel. Instead, such
systems should rely only on the CDC to determine
when recording should commence or stop. Agencies
should confirm their CALEA equipment’s behavior
with their vendors.
Additionally, wiretap evidence, whether collected by
loop-extender or CALEA systems, should be evaluated
by investigators for signs of signaling countermeasures. In
particular, records of dialed numbers and call times
should be examined for discrepancies against telephone
company call detail records. This reconciliation should
be performed routinely and as soon as possible after the
records become available.
We also strongly urge that J-STD-025A and other in-
terception standards and practices undergo a critical se-
curity review against countermeasures such as those
discussed here and, more generally, against a broader
threat model. The relatively simple signaling counter-
measures in this article became quickly apparent even
from our somewhat cursory analysis. It appears that a
systematic search for vulnerabilities under a threat model
that includes subject-initiated countermeasures wasn’t
part of the development process for either the J-STD-
025A standard or many of the systems that implement it. 
As wiretap systems become more homogeneous and
standardized, the consequences of vulnerabilities be-
come increasingly serious. Any weaknesses in J-STD-
025A systems could have the unintended and somewhat
ironic consequence of degrading law enforcement’s abil-
ity to conduct wiretaps on the advanced digital and mo-
bile systems that CALEA envisioned. J-STD-025A
standardizes the delivery of intercepted content to law
enforcement across many different communications ser-
vices, thus any countermeasures against these systems
threaten law enforcement’s access to the entire spectrum
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of intercepted communications. We suggest that the law
enforcement community develop and articulate security
and assurance requirements for interception systems
against which existing and future standards and tech-
nologies will be measured. 
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accounting system at the caller’s switch would continue to record
the original call as if it were still in progress. It was therefore
possible for subscribers to defeat the billing system by starting the
process with a call to an inexpensive or toll-free long-distance
number and spoofing the idle signal and routing tones for what
would have otherwise been a more expensive call.
By 1971, the in-band signaling flaws came to national
attention,1,2 bringing about an arms race of sorts between blue-
box users (so-called phone phreaks) and telephone companies
seeking to protect their billing revenue (and prevent unauthorized
access to the internal signaling network in general). AT&T even-
tually developed an out-of-band “common channel” long-distance
signaling architecture3 that defeated the blue box by eliminating
in-band interoffice signaling. The new system wasn’t fully deployed
in the US until the mid 1980s, however.
The vulnerabilities in loop-extender and CALEA wiretap
systems—and the methods for exploiting them—are strikingly
reminiscent of the weaknesses of the 1960s telephone network. It’s
notable that even though CALEA primarily uses out-of-band
signals, the C tone idle signal mechanism (when present) remains
in-band and vulnerable to exploitation by the target.
Unfortunately, although the weaknesses themselves might be
similar, the telephone industry’s response to the problem isn’t as
directly applicable as might be hoped in forming a response to
wiretap countermeasures. A contemporary article4 suggested a
three-pronged approach to mitigating the effects of the blue box:
the first was user education on the ethical pitfalls of telephone fraud,
the second was vigorous detection and prosecution of those com-
mitting fraud, and the third was migration to out-of-band signaling.
Note that the first two prongs aimed for deterrence, not prevention.
In retrospect, this strategy was at least partly effective—defrauding
the telephone company is a serious crime. Fraud-detection tech-
nology was deployed selectively throughout the network to aid in
identifying suspected blue-box users, who were subject to widely
publicized criminal prosecutions. The prospect of detection and
prosecution presumably dissuaded many otherwise law-abiding
would-be blue boxers in the years before the vulnerability was fixed.
Deterring exploitation of wiretap countermeasures seems to be
a much more difficult problem than deterring toll fraud, not least
because many of those most motivated to deploy such counter-
measures are already criminals (and, in any case, the use of wiretap
countermeasures is generally not, in and of itself, a crime).
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